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#### Passage of immigration reform is likely, both sides agree it is a top priority and congress is willing to cooperate

Clifford, 12/30 (Mike, 12/30/2013, “Immigration Reform Supporters: “Positive Signs” Headed into 2014,” <http://www.publicnewsservice.org/2013-12-30/immigrant-issues/immigration-reform-supporters-positive-signs-headed-into-2014/a36538-1)>)

NEW YORK - Supporters of comprehensive immigration reform fell short of their goal in 2013, but several things happened in December to swing momentum in their direction, they say. The first positive sign, according to Jim Wallis, Sojourners president and founder, was the House and Senate working together to pass a budget bill. And, while Speaker Boehner has said immigration reform would have to wait until next year, Wallis said there are signs Republicans are ready to act. "I hear Republican leaders - Goodlatte from Judiciary - saying this will be a top priority in 2014," Wallis said. "John Boehner has hired a really talented aide to help with immigration - she knows the topic well, and she's for reform." At his final 2013 news conference, President Obama called on House members to pass the immigration reform measure approved by the Senate, but Speaker Boehner has said he won't bring that version up for a vote.

#### Plan costs PC

Lobel – 1ac author – 9

Jules Lobel, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh, “Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution,” Center for Constitutional Rights White Paper, http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR\_White\_WarPowers.pdf

Secondly, the War Powers Resolution correctly recognized that even congressional silence, inaction or even implicit approval does not allow the president to engage in warfare – but it failed to provide an adequate enforcement mechanism if the president did so. Under the resolution, wars launched by the executive were supposed to be automatically terminated after 60 or 90 days if not affirmatively authorized by Congress – but this provision proved unenforceable. Presidents simply ignored it, Congress had an insufficient interest in enforcing it and the courts responded by effectually saying: if Congress did nothing, why should we? Reforming the War Powers Resolution is a project that will require leadership from the President and the political will of Congress,working together in the service and preservation of the Constitution. In light of the abuses that have taken place under the Bush administration, it is the responsibility of a new administration to insist on transparency in the drafting of new legislation. There is a long history of attempts to revise the War Powers Resolution. As new legislation is drafted though, it will be important to focus on the central constitutional issues. Much time has been spent in debating how to address contingencies. It will be impossible to write into law any comprehensive formula for every conceivable situation, though; much more important will be establishing the fundamental principles of reform: The War Powers Resolution should explicitly prohibit executive acts of war without previous Congressional authorization. The only exception should be the executive’s power in an emergency to use short-term force to repel sudden attacks on US territories, troops or citizens. It is true that many potential conflict situations will be murky, complicated or divisive, and that quick congressional action may not always be forthcoming. Yet, history shows the folly of launching wars that are not supported by the American people. The United States should not use military force until a substantial consensus develops in Congress and the public that military force is necessary, appropriate and wise.

#### Obama’s capital key to ensuring passage

Orlando Sentinel, 11/1 (11/1/2013, “What we think: It'll take both parties to clear immigration logjam,” <http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-11-01/news/os-ed-immigration-reform-congress-20131031_1_immigration-reform-comprehensive-reform-house-republicans>, JMP)

For those who thought the end of the government shutdown would provide a break from the partisan bickering in Washington, think again. The battle over comprehensive immigration reform could be every bit as contentious. Polls show the popular momentum is there for comprehensive reform, which would include a path to citizenship for many of the nation's 11 million undocumented immigrants. But it'll take plenty of political capital from President Obama and leaders in both parties on Capitol Hill to make it happen. Immigration-reform activists, who have been pushing for reform for years, are understandably impatient. This week police arrested 15 who blocked traffic at a demonstration in Orlando. There are plenty of selling points for comprehensive immigration reform. An opportunity for millions of immigrants to get on the right side of the law. Stronger border security. The chance for law enforcement to focus limited resources on real threats to public safety, instead of nannies and fruit pickers. A more reliable work force to meet the needs of key industries. Reforms to let top talent from around the world stay here after studying in U.S. universities. The Senate passed its version of comprehensive immigration in June. It includes all of the benefits above. Its path to citizenship requires undocumented immigrants to pay fines, learn English, pass a criminal background check and wait more than a decade. So far, House Republicans have balked, taking a piecemeal rather than comprehensive approach. Many members fear being challenged from the right for supporting "amnesty." Yet polls show the public supports comprehensive reform. In June, a Gallup poll found 87 percent of Americans — including 86 percent of Republicans — support a pathway to citizenship like the one outlined in the Senate bill. Florida Republican Sen. Marco Rubio took flak from tea-party supporters for spearheading the comprehensive bill. Now, apparently aiming to mend fences, he says immigration should be handled piecemeal. He's politically savvy enough to know that's a dead end. But comprehensive reform won't have a chance without President Obama making full use of his bully pulpit to promote it, emphasizing in particular all that undocumented immigrants would need to do to earn citizenship. House Democratic leaders will have to underscore the president's message.

#### Reform key to the economy – immigrants are key to several critical sectors

West, ‘09 – Director of Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution (7/22/09, Darrell M., “The Path to a New Immigration Reform,” http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0721\_immigration\_reform\_west.aspx)

Skeptics need to understand how important a new immigration policy is to American competitiveness and long-term economic development. High-skill businesses require a sufficient number of scientists and engineers. Many industries such as construction, landscaping, health care and hospitality services are reliant on immigrant labor. Farmers need seasonal workers for agricultural productivity. Critics who worry about resource drains must understand that immigrants spend money on goods and services, pay taxes and perform jobs and start businesses vital to our economy. Beyond the economy, immigration reform prospects improve considerably across a fresh political landscape that features a popular Democratic president armed with substantial Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, many who appear receptive to comprehensive reform. Obama has called repeatedly for big ideas and bold policy actions. The country needs new policies that emphasize the importance of immigrant workers \_ across the skills spectrum \_ to our country's long-term financial future. Our universities invest millions in training foreign students but then send them home without any U.S. job opportunities that would take advantage of their new skills. And investing in the children of middle- and lower-skilled immigrants is wise as we recognize their majority role in our workforce as the next generation rises.

#### Extinction

Harris and Burrows, ‘09 [Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>]

Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

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#### The United States Federal Government should require Congressional authorization prior to initiating offensive use of military force, unless to repel attacks on the United States or Israel.

#### Consistent statements in support of U.S. security assurances that the US will come to the defense of Israel if they are under attack are key to prevent Israeli lashout

Murdock 09, Sr Advisor CSIS

(Clark A.-, Jessica M. Yeats, Linton F. Brooks, M. Elaine Bunn, Franklin C. Miller, James L. Schoff, CSIS Workshop Proceeding and Key Takeaways, “Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance”, <http://csis.org/files/publication/091218_nuclear_posture.pdf>)

U.S. security assurances to Israel probably have their greatest impact on Israel’s calculus on whether it should act preventively (as it did in the past against Iraq and Syria) against Iran. Former Israeli Deputy National Security Adviser Chuck Freilich argues that “Israel’s understanding of American strategy…would affect Israel’s determination to act unilaterally…[and] Israel’s willingness to discuss options for living with a nuclear Iran would be affected by a better appreciation of American strategy and of the deterrent options the United States would be willing to consider.” In whatever form they may take, U.S. statements and actions that strengthen Israel’s confidence in U.S. assurances, both in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and coping with a nuclear Iran, will make it less likely that Israel will feel compelled to preemptively attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. Recent developments – particularly in missile defense cooperation – appear to be helping in this regard. In a stark change of tone, Israeli Defense Minister Eduh Barak was recently quoted saying, "Israel is strong and I do not see anyone capable of representing a threat to our existence…right now is the moment for diplomacy.”146 The Washington Post reported that this strength is derived from three parts: “its nuclear capabilities…the assumption that the United States would stand behind Israel if it came under attack…[and] the calculation that enough of the country’s air bases and military facilities would survive a first strike to retaliate effectively.”147

#### An Israeli strike collapses the global economy, heg, and sparks war with China and Russia

Reuveny 10, Public Affairs Professor at Indiana

(Rafael, Guest Opinion: Unilateral strike on Iran could trigger world depression, www.indiana.edu/~spea/news/speaking\_out/reuveny\_on\_unilateral\_strike\_Iran.shtml)

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash. For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force. Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground. All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians, but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well. By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early-warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces. Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike — or even numerous strikes — could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond. A regional war Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents. Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat. In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973. An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe. The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony. Replaying Nixon’s nightmare Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario. Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted. If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force. While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

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#### Korea is the most volatile hotspot in the world and risk of North Korean miscalc is high – US deterrence across the DMZ is key

MARTHA RADDATZ and LUIS MARTINEZ – 4/2/13, U.S. General Says North Korea Situation Is 'Volatile' and 'Dangerous', http://abcnews.go.com/International/us-general-north-korea-situation-volatile-dangerous/story?id=18863864&singlePage=true

Gen. James Thurman, the top U.S. commander in South Korea, said that in his two years on the job he has never seen things as tense as they are right now, telling ABC News the situation on the Korean peninsula is "volatile" and "dangerous." Thurman said in his exclusive interview with ABC News that his " job is to prevent war," but that his greatest fear is a "miscalculation" that causes "a kinetic provocation." In military parlance, kinetic refers to combat. Thurman said North Korea's recent rhetoric has made the situation on the Korean peninsula "a dangerous period," but he added, "I think we're managing it quite well because on this side of the line we're very calm. And we're confident." Thurman commands the 28,500 American military forces based in South Korea and also serves as the commander of United Nations Command. The interview was conducted in one of the buildings at Panmunjon along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) where South Korean and North Korean military forces face off just steps away from each other. Thurman believes the "tough talk" from Kim Jong Un, North Korea's young leader, is him "trying to play to his internal audience." However, Thurman said that more importantly Kim is also trying "to intimidate the South Koreans and intimidate the region And we're not going to let that happen." The general thinks South Korea is serious when it says it will respond militarily to any offensive action by North Korea. "I believe they will because we have a right to protect ourselves. And again we're not going to let the North Koreans intimidate us," said Thurman. Thurman said with the North Korean rhetoric at such a high level his greatest fear is "a miscalculation. An impulsive decision that causes a kinetic provocation." The general said he has to take North Korea's rhetoric seriously. Asked if he thought they were empty threats Thurman said "No, I don't think that they are. We've got to take every threat seriously." With so little known about Kim Jong Un, Thurman said he is not sure what his true intentions are :because he's kind of reckless right now with his talk and all that." North Korea's latest provocation came today when it announced that it was restarting the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon that it had closed down in 2007. The plant could be used to produce additional plutonium for its nuclear weapons program. While he described North Korea's missiles as their largest threat, Thurman pointed across the DMZ and noted "there's 14,000 tubes of artillery just across this line beyond that far mountain range over there." That artillery poses a direct threat to Seoul, the South Korean capital which is located just 27 miles from the DMZ. But if North Korea launches an offensive operation against South Korea Thurman said "I think we got to be ready to go." "We will defend ourselves. We don't want to respond to some type of deceptive move into a rapid escalation into a conflict ... My job is to prevent war." Thurman said the North Korean ballistic missile threat have the range to potentially hit the United States though "they haven't demonstrated the full capabilities that they can do an intercontinental ballistic missile as far as the delivery... I think they have a long way to go in my assessment." "I think as we look at the missile portfolio North Korea has, we protect the homeland number one and make sure all our assets are available so we can provide protection if necessary." Thurman would not discuss what those protection options might be though "everything is on the table." On Monday the U.S. Navy confirmed that it had sent the guided missile destroyer, USS John S McCain, to the waters off of South Korea. The ship carries SM-3 missiles capable of shooting down North Korean ballistic missiles. And today the Pentagon confirmed that an additional destroyer, the USS Decatur, was ordered to remain in the Pacific region. Thurman explained that the ships' movements, as well as the public acknowledgement that long range American bombers had conducted training missions over South Korea, were about sending a message of deterrence to North Korea. "Defending the Republic of Korea against aggression is all about deterrence. And I think we've got good deterrence," said Thurman. "I'm confident as the commander here in what we need to do should hostilities break out." While North Korea's rhetoric has raised tensions Thurman believes the situation will "calm down. I'm confident it will. I'm optimistic about it." He pointed to the practical reason that North Korea routinely uses its military to work the fields during the farming season "so that they can have a good harvest."

#### Changes in US defense commitments below the nuclear threshold collapse extended deterrence in Korea

Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper - Oct 2013, Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Reassurance in the Pacific during the Second Nuclear Age, Brooks = badass, former nuclear sub commander, and nonresident senior adviser at CSIS, http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=706#.Uoi1Mfl1ySo

The need to simultaneously deter China and North Korea, assure multiple allies, and reassure China, combined with regional nuclear dynamics, makes extended deterrence more complex now than during the Cold War. Particularly challenging is deterring low-level confrontations in the maritime sphere and, in the future, the cyber domain. The Asia-Pacific region is subject to a “security trilemma,” where U.S. actions to deter North Korea can have negative consequences for U.S. and allied security relations with China, making both assurance and reassurance much more difficult. Japan and South Korea have unique assurance requirements and need separate consideration. Reassuring China is particularly important but particularly difficult. Policy Implications Because both China and U.S. allies (especially Japan) are concerned about extended-deterrence commitments below the nuclear threshold, the U.S. should review the management of those commitments and use the results of that review to expand dialogue with allies and China. Because assuring its allies is inherently difficult, the U.S. should continue extensive consultations on extended deterrence, especially with Japan and South Korea, should make no major changes in declaratory policy on nuclear use, and should maintain rough strategic nuclear parity with Russia to avoid allied perceptions of U.S. inferiority. Because China believes the U.S. seeks to deny it an effective deterrent, U.S. leaders should reassure China by privately conveying Washington’s acceptance of mutual vulnerability as a fact of life and by working to implement modest confidence-building measures.

#### Extinction

Hayes & Hamel-Green, 10 – \*Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, AND \*\* Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf>)

The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing humanity, not least of which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Korea and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear use arguably have increased in recent years. This negative trend is a product of continued US nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over China’s increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (“nuclear umbrella”) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied upon for protection. The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the **possibility of nuclear attack**1, whether by **intention, miscalculation, or merely accident**, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. **Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions.** But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could **make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison**. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with **subsequent nuclear breakout** and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and **aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states.** The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

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#### **aff’s use of the law is a militaristic tactic that creates legal legitimacy to propel more frequent, more deadly violent interventions that ensure infrastructural violence that maims civilians – they actively displace moral questions in favor of a pathologically detached question of legality**

Smith 2 – prof of phil @ U of South Florida

(Thomas, *International Studies Quarterly* 46, The New Law of War: Legitimizing Hi-Tech and Infrastructural Violence)

The role of military lawyers in all this has, according to one study, “changed irrevocably” ~Keeva, 1991:59!. Although liberal theorists point to the broad normative contours that law lends to international relations, the Pentagon wields law with technical precision. During the Gulf War and the Kosovo campaign, JAGs opined on the legal status of multinational forces, the U.S. War Powers Resolution, rules of engagement and targeting, country fly-overs, maritime interceptions, treatment of prisoners, hostages and “human shields,” and methods used to gather intelligence. Long before the bombing began, lawyers had joined in the development and acquisition of weapons systems, tactical planning, and troop training. In the Gulf War, the U.S. deployed approximately 430 military lawyers, the allies far fewer, leading to some amusing but perhaps apposite observations about the legalistic culture of America ~Garratt, 1993!. Many lawyers reviewed daily Air Tasking Orders as well as land tactics. Others found themselves on the ground and at the front. According to Colonel Rup- pert, the idea was to “put the lawyer as far forward as possible” ~Myrow, 1996–97!. During the Kosovo campaign, lawyers based at the Combined Allied Operations Center in Vicenza, Italy, and at NATO headquarters in Brussels approved every single targeting decision. We do not know precisely how decisions were taken in either Iraq or Kosovo or the extent to which the lawyers reined in their masters. Some “corrections and adjustments” to the target lists were made ~Shot- well, 1993:26!, but by all accounts the lawyers—and the law—were extremely accommodating. The exigencies of war invite professional hazards as military lawyers seek to “find the law” and to determine their own responsibilities as legal counselors. A 1990 article in Military Law Review admonished judge advocates not to neglect their duty to point out breaches of the law, but not to become military ombuds- men either. The article acknowledged that the JAG faces pressure to demonstrate that he can be a “force multiplier” who can “show the tactical and political soundness of his interpretation of the law” ~Winter, 1990:8–9!. Some tension between law and necessity is inevitable, but over the past decade the focus has shifted visibly from restraining violence to legitimizing it. The Vietnam-era perception that law was a drag on operations has been replaced by a zealous “client culture” among judge advocates. Commanding officers “have come to realize that, as in the relationship of corporate counsel to CEO, the JAG’s role is not to create obstacles, but to find legal ways to achieve his client’s goals—even when those goals are to blow things up and kill people” ~Keeva, 1991:59!. Lt. Col. Tony Montgomery, the JAG who approved the bombing of the Belgrade television studios, said recently that “judges don’t lay down the law. We take guidance from our government on how much of the consequences they are willing to accept” ~The Guardian, 2001!. Military necessity is undeterred. In a permissive legal atmosphere, hi-tech states can meet their goals and remain within the letter of the law. As noted, humanitarian law is firmest in areas of marginal military utility. When opera- tional demands intrude, however, even fundamental rules begin to erode. The Defense Department’s final report to Congress on the Gulf War ~DOD, 1992! found nothing in the principle of noncombatant immunity to curb necessity. Heartened by the knowledge that civilian discrimination is “one of the least codified portions” of the law of war ~p. 611!, the authors argued that “to the degree possible and consistent with allowable risk to aircraft and aircrews,” muni- tions and delivery systems were chosen to reduce collateral damage ~p. 612!. “An attacker must exercise reasonable precautions to minimize incidental or collat- eral injury to the civilian population or damage to civilian objects, consistent with mission accomplishments and allowable risk to the attacking forces” ~p. 615!. The report notes that planners targeted “specific military objects in populated areas which the law of war permits” and acknowledges the “commingling” of civilian and military objects, yet the authors maintain that “at no time were civilian areas as such attacked” ~p. 613!. The report carefully constructed a precedent for future conflicts in which human shields might be deployed, noting “the presence of civilians will not render a target immune from attack” ~p. 615!. The report insisted ~pp. 606–607! that Protocol I as well as the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons “were not legally applicable” to the Gulf War because Iraq as well as some Coalition members had not ratified them. More to the point that law follows practice, the report claimed that certain provisions of Protocol I “are not a codification of the customary practice of nations,” and thus “ignore the realities of war” ~p. 616!. Nor can there be any doubt that a more elaborate legal regime has kept pace with evolving strategy and technology. Michael Ignatieff details in Virtual War ~2000! how targets were “developed” in 72-hour cycles that involved collecting and reviewing aerial reconnaissance, gauging military necessity, and coding antici- pated collateral damage down to the directional spray of bomb debris. A judge advocate then vetted each target in light of the Geneva Conventions and calcu- lated whether or not the overall advantage to be gained outweighed any expected civilian spillover. Ignatieff argues ~2000:198–199! that this elaborate symbiosis of law and technology has given birth to a “veritable casuistry of war.” Legal fine print, hand-in-hand with new technology, replaced deeper deliberation about the use of violence in war. The law provided “harried decision-makers with a critical guarantee of legal coverage, turning complex issues of morality into technical issues of legality.” Astonishingly fine discrimination also meant that unintentional civilian casualties were assumed to have been unintentional, not foreseen tragedies to be justified under the rule of double effect or the fog of war. The crowning irony is that NATO went to such lengths to justify its targets and limit collateral damage, even as it assured long-term civilian harm by destroying the country’s infrastructure. Perhaps the most powerful justification was provided by law itself. War is often dressed up in patriotic abstractions—Periclean oratory, jingoistic newsreels, or heroic memorials. Bellum Americanum is cloaked in the stylized language of law. The DOD report is padded with references to treaty law, some of it obscure, that was “applicable” to the Gulf War, as if a surfeit of legal citation would convince skeptics of the propriety of the war. Instances of humane restraint invariably were presented as the rule of law in action. Thus the Allies did not gas Iraqi troops, torture POWs, or commit acts of perfidy. Most striking is the use of legal language to justify the erosion of noncombatant immunity. Hewing to the legal- isms of double effect, the Allies never intentionally targeted civilians as such. As noted, by codifying double effect the law artificially bifurcates intentions. Har- vard theologian Bryan Hehir ~1996:7! marveled at the Coalition’s legalistic word- play, noting that the “briefers out of Riyadh sounded like Jesuits as they sought to defend the policy from any charge of attempting to directly attack civilians.” The Pentagon’s legal narrative is certainly detached from the carnage on the ground, but it also oversimplifies and even actively obscures the moral choices involved in aerial bombing. Lawyers and tacticians made very deliberate decisions about aircraft, flight altitudes, time of day, ordnance dropped, confidence in intelligence, and so forth. By expanding military necessity to encompass an extremely prudential reading of “force protection,” these choices were calculated to protect pilots and planes at the expense of civilians on the ground, departing from the just war tradition that combatants assume greater risks than civilians. While it is tempting to blame collateral damage on the fog of war, much of that uncertainty has been lifted by technology and precision law. Similarly, in Iraq and in Yugoslavia the focus was on “degrading” military capabilities, yet a loose view of dual use spelled the destruction of what were essentially social, economic, and political targets. Coalition and NATO officials were quick to apologize for accidental civilian casualties, but in hi-tech war most noncombatant suffering is by design. Does the law of war reduce death and destruction? International law certainly has helped to delegitimize, and in rare cases effectively criminalize, direct attacks on civilians. But in general humanitarian law has mirrored wartime practice. On the ad bellum side, the erosion of right authority and just cause has eased the path toward war. Today, foreign offices rarely even bother with formal declarations of war. Under the United Nations system it is the responsibility of the Security Council to denounce illegal war, but for a number of reasons its members have been extremely reluctant to brand states as aggressors. If the law were less accommodating, greater effort might be devoted to diplomacy and war might be averted. On the in bello side the ban on direct civilian strikes remains intact, but double effect and military demands have been contrived to justify unnecessary civilian deaths. Dual use law has been stretched to sanction new forms of violence against civilians. Though not as spectacular as the obliteration bombing to which it so often is favorably compared, infrastructural war is far deadlier than the rhetoric of a “clean and legal” conflict suggests. It is true that rough estimates of the ratio of bomb tonnage to civilian deaths in air attacks show remarkable reductions in immediate collateral damage. There were some 40.83 deaths per ton in the bombing of Guernica in 1937 and 50.33 deaths per ton in the bombing of Tokyo in 1945. In the Kosovo campaign, by contrast, there were between .077 and .084 deaths per ton. In Iraq there were a mere .034 ~Thomas, 2001:169!. According to the classical definition of collateral damage, civilian protection has improved dramatically, but if one takes into account the staggering long-term effects of the war in Iraq, for example, aerial bombing looks anything but humane. For aerial bombers themselves modern war does live up to its clean and legal image. While war and intervention have few steadfast constituents, the myth of immaculate warfare has eased fears that intervening soldiers may come to harm, which polls in the U.S., at least, rank as being of great public concern, and even greater military concern. A new survey of U.S. civilian and military attitudes found that soldiers were two to four times more casualty-averse than civilians thought they should be ~Feaver and Kohn, 2001!. By removing what is perhaps the greatest restraint on the use of force—the possibility of soldiers dying—law and technology have given rise to the novel moral hazards of a “postmodern, risk-free, painless war” ~Woollacott, 1999!. “We’ve come to expect the immacu- late,” notes Martin Cook, who teaches ethics at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA. “Precision-guided munitions make it very much easier to go to war than it ever has been historically.” Albert Pierce, director of the Center for the Study of Professional Military Ethics at the U.S. Naval Academy argues, “standoff precision weapons give you the option to lower costs and risks . . . but you might be tempted to do things that you might otherwise not do” ~Belsie, 1999!. Conclusion The utility of law to legitimize modern warfare should not be underestimated. Even in the midst of war, legal arguments retain an aura of legitimacy that is missing in “political” justifications. The aspirations of humanitarian law are sound. Rather, it is the instrumental use of law that has oiled the skids of hi-tech violence. Not only does the law defer to military necessity, even when very broadly defined, but more importantly it bestows on those same military demands all the moral and psychological trappings of legality. The result has been to legalize and thus to justify in the public mind “inhumane military methods and their consequences,” as violence against civilians is carried out “behind the protective veil of justice” ~af Jochnick and Normand, 1994a:50!. Hi-tech states can defend hugely destructive, essentially unopposed, aerial bombardment by citing the authority of seemingly secular and universal legal standards. The growing gap between hi- and low-tech means may exacerbate inequalities in moral capital as well, as the sheer barbarism of “premodern” violence committed by ethnic cleansers or atavistic warlords makes the methods employed by hi-tech warriors seem all the more clean and legal by contrast. This fusion of law and technology is likely to propel future American interventions. Despite assurances that the campaign against terrorism would differ from past conflicts, the allied air war in Afghanistan, marked by record numbers of unmanned drones and bomber flights at up to 35,000 feet, or nearly 7 miles aloft, rarely strayed from the hi-tech and legalistic script. While the attack on the World Trade Center confirmed a thousand times over the illegality and inhu- manity of terrorism, the U.S. response has raised further issues of legality and inhumanity in conventional warfare. Civilian deaths in the campaign have been substantial because “military objects” have been targeted on the basis of extremely low-confidence intelligence. In several cases targets appear to have been chosen based on misinformation and even rank rumor. A liberal reading of dual use and the authorization of bombers to strike unvetted “targets of opportunity” also increased collateral damage. Although 10,000 of the 18,000 bombs, missiles, and other ordnance used in Afghanistan were precision-guided munitions, the war resulted in roughly 1000 to 4000 direct civilian deaths, and, according to the UNHCR, produced 900,000 new refugees and displaced persons. The Pentagon has nevertheless viewed the campaign as “a more antiseptic air war even than the one waged in Kosovo” ~Dao, 2001!. General Tommy Franks, who commanded the campaign, called it “the most accurate war ever fought in this nation’s history” ~Schmitt, 2002!.9 No fundamental change is in sight. Governments continue to justify collateral damage by citing the marvels of technology and the authority of international law. One does see a widening rift between governments and independent human rights and humanitarian relief groups over the interpretation of targeting and dual-use law. But these disputes have only underscored the ambiguities of human- itarian law. As long as interventionist states dominate the way that the rules of war are crafted and construed, hopes of rescuing law from politics will be dim indeed.

#### **militarism is a fundamentally unsustainable system that is the root cause of all extinction threats and ensures mass structural violence – non-violence is the only possible response**

Kovel 2

(Joel, “The United States Military Machine”, http://www.joelkovel.org/americanmilitary.htm; Jacob)

I want to talk to you this evening about war - not the immediate threat of us war against Iraq, but about how this conflict is an instance of a larger tendency toward war-making endemic to our society. In other words, the phrase from the folksong, “I ain’t gonna study war no more,” should be rethought. I think we do have to study war. Not to make war but to understand more deeply how it is put together and about the awful choices that are now being thrust upon us. These remarks have been stimulated by recent events, which have ancient roots, but have taken on a new shape since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of the second Bush administration, and the inception of the so-called “War on Terror.” The shape is that of permanent warfare- war-making that has no particular strategic goal except total us dominance over global society. Hence, a war without end and whose internal logic is to perpetuate itself. We are, in other words, well into World War III, which will go on whether or not any other state such as Iraq is involved. It is quite probable that this administration will go to war in Iraq, inasmuch as certain very powerful people crave it. But it is not necessarily the case, given the fact that the war against Iraq is such a lunatic proposal that many other people in high places are against it and too many people are marching against it. And while war against Iraq is a very serious matter that needs to be checked by massive popular resistance, equally serious are the structures now in place in the United States dictating that whether or not the war in Iraq takes place, there will be another war to replace it, and others after that, unless some very basic changes take place. America Has Become a War-Making Machine The United States has always been a bellicose and expansive country, built on violent conquest and expropriation of native peoples. Since the forming of the American republic, military interventions have occurred at the rate of about once a year. Consider the case of Nicaragua, a country utterly incapable of being any kind of a threat to its giant northern neighbor. Yet prior to the Sandinista revolution in 1979 (which was eventually crushed by us proxy forces a decade later), our country had invaded Nicaragua no fewer than 14 times in the pursuit of its imperial interests. A considerable number of contemporary states, such as Britain, South Africa, Russia, and Israel, have been formed in just such a way. But one of the special conditions of the formation of America, despite its aggressivity, was an inhibition against a military machine as such. If you remember, no less a figure than George Washington warned us against having a standing army, and indeed the great bulk of us interventions prior to World War II were done without very much in the way of fixed military institutions. However, after WWII a basic change set in. War-weary America longed for demobilization, yet after a brief beginning in this direction, the process was halted and the permanent warfare state started to take shape. In part, this was because policy planners knew quite well that massive wartime mobilization had been the one measure that finally lifted America out of the Great Depression of the 1930s. One of the lessons of that time was that propounded by the British economist John Maynard Keynes, to the effect that capitalist societies could ameliorate chronic [economic] crises by infusions of government spending. The Great War had certified this wisdom, and permanent military expenditure readily became the received wisdom. This was greatly reinforced by the drastic realignment of capitalist power as a result of the war. America was essentially the only capitalist power in 1945 that did not lay in ruins and/or have its empire shattered. The world had been realigned and the United States had assumed a global imperial role. Policy planners like George Kennan lucidly realized that this meant safeguarding extreme inequalities in wealth, which implied a permanent garrison to preserve the order of things. The notion was especially compelling given that one other state, the Soviet Union, had emerged a great power from the war and was the bellwether of those forces that sought to break down the prevailing distribution of wealth. The final foundation stone for the new military order was the emergence of frightful weapons of mass destruction, dominance over which became an essential element for world hegemony. The Iron Triangle These factors crystallized into the Cold War, the nuclear arms race, and, domestically, into those structures that gave institutional stability and permanence to the system: the military-industrial complex (mic). Previously the us had used militarism to secure economic advantage. Now, two developments greatly transformed our militarism: the exigencies of global hegemony and the fact that militarism became a direct source of economic advantage, through the triangular relations of the mic with the great armament industries comprising one leg, the military establishment another, and the state apparatus the third, profits, power, and personnel could flow through the system and from the system. Clearly, this arrangement had the potential to greatly undermine American democracy. It was a “national security state” within the state but also extended beyond it into the economy and society at large, virtually insulated from popular input, and had the power to direct events and generate threats. Another conservative war hero-become-president, Dwight Eisenhower, warned the nation in a speech in 1961 against the emerging permanent war machine, but this time, the admonitions were not heeded.\* The machine made a kind of war against the Soviet system for 35 years. Although actual guns were not fired between the two adversaries, as many as 10 million people died in its varied peripheral conflicts, from Korea to Vietnam, Angola, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. The Cold War divided the world into bipolar imperial camps, directed by gigantic superpowers that lived off each other’s hostility. It was a terrible war whose immense suffering took place largely outside the view of the American people, but it also brought about an uneasy kind of stability in the world order, in part through the standoff in nuclear weapons. During the Ford and Carter administrations, another great crisis seized the world capitalist economy. Having matured past the rebuilding that followed the world war, a period of stagnation set in, which still has the global economy in its grip despite episodic flashes of vigor. Predictably, a spate of militarism was central to the response. A “Second Cold War” took place under Reagan, featuring an accelerated nuclear arms race, which was deliberately waged so as to encourage Soviet countermeasures in the hope that this would cause breakdown in the much weaker, bloated, and corrupt Russian system. The plan worked splendidly: by 1989-91, the mighty Soviet empire collapsed, and the bipolar world order became unipolar, setting a stage for the current phase. The fall of the Soviet Union was widely expected to bring a ìpeace dividend.î This would have been the case according to the official us line, parroted throughout the media and academe, that our military apparatus was purely defensive (after all, we have no Department of War, only one of "Defense") and reactive to Soviet expansionism and military/nuclear threat. As this was no longer a factor, so the reasoning wentóindeed, as the us now stood bestride the world militarily as had no power since the Roman Empireóconventional logic predicted a general diminution in American militarism after 1991, with corresponding benefits to society. The last decade has at least settled this question, for the effect on us aggression, interventionism, and the militarization of society has been precisely the opposite. In other words, instead of braking, the machine accelerated. Removal of Soviet power did not diminish Americaís imperial appetite: it removed inhibitions on its internally driven expansiveness. As a result, enhanced war-making has replaced the peace dividend. The object of this machine has passed from dealing with Soviet Communism to a more complex and dispersed set of oil wars (Iraq I and now II), police actions against international miscreants (Kosovo), and now the ubiquitous War Against Terror, aimed variously at Islamic fundamentalists, Islam as a whole, or anybody irritated enough with the ruling order to take up some kind of arms against it. The comparison with the Roman Empire is here very exact. As the eminent economist and sociologist Joseph Schumpeter described Rome in 1919: “There was no corner of the known world where some interest was not alleged to be in danger or under actual attack. If the interests were not Roman, they were those of Rome’s allies. And if Rome had no allies existed, the allies would be invented. The fight was always invested with the order of legality. Rome was always being attacked by evil-minded neighbors.” The logic of constant threat meshes with that of ruthless expansion, which we see everywhere in this epoch of unipolar world dominion. Currently, the military budget of the us is 334 billion dollars. The budget for the next fiscal year is 379 billion dollars- an increase of more than 10 percent. By 2007, the projected military budget of the us is to be an astounding 451 billion dollars: almost half a trillion dollars, without the presence of anything resembling a conventional war. The present military budget is greater than the sum of all other military budgets. In fact, it is greater than the entire federal budget of Russia, once America's immortal adversary, and comprises more than half - 52 percent of all discretionary spending by the us government. (By comparison, education accounts for 8 percent of the federal budget.) A considerable portion of this is given over to "military Keynesianism," according to the well-established paths of the mic. Thus, although in the first years after the fall of the ussr certain firms like General Dynamics, which had played a large role in the nuclear arms race, suffered setbacks, that problem has been largely reversed for the entire class of firms fattening at the trough of militarism. It is fair to say, though, that the largesse is distributed over a wider scale, in accordance with the changing pattern of armaments. us Armies Taking Root Everywhere From having scarcely any standing army in 1940, American armies now stand everywhere. One feature of us military policy since WWII is to make war and then stay where war was made, rooting itself in foreign territory. Currently, the us has military bases in 113 countries, with 11 new ones formed since the beginning of the War Against Terror. The us now has bases in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kurdistan, encircling China and creating new sources of military tension. On these bases, the us military has erected some 800,000 buildings. Imagine that: 800,000 buildings in foreign countries that are now occupied by us military establishments. And America still maintains large forces in Germany, Japan, and Korea, with tens of thousands of troops permanently on duty (and making mischief, as two us servicemen recently ran over and killed two Korean girls, provoking massive demonstrations). After the first Gulf War the us military became installed in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, in which latter place it currently occupies one quarter of the country - 750 square miles devoted to military activity. This huge investment is no doubt determined by proximity to Iraq. Again, after going to war in Kosovo, the us left behind an enormous base in a place called Bondsteel. These self-expanding sites of militarism are permanent goads to terrorist organizations. Recall that one of Osama bin Laden's professed motivations for al-Qaeda's attacks on American facilities was the presence of us bases in his home country of Saudi Arabia. The bases are also permanent hazards to the environment - indeed, the us, with some 800,000 buildings on these military sites, is the world's largest polluter and the largest consumer of fossil fuels. With territorial expansion of the us military apparatus, there is a corresponding expansion of mission. For instance, in Colombia, where billions of us dollars are spent in the "War on Drugs," us troops are now being asked to take care of pipelines through which vital oil reserves are passing. In addition, the War on Drugs is now subsumed into the War Against Terror. The signifier of Terror has virtually unlimited elasticity, for once an apparatus reaches the size of the us military machine, threats can be seen anywhere. With the inauguration of the new hard-line president of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe, the us authorized the use of 1.7 billion dollars in military aid hitherto limited to anti-drug operations for direct attacks on deeply entrenched farc guerrillas. This redirection of aid came after Colombian officials and their American supporters in the Congress and Bush administration argued that the change was needed as part of the global campaign against terrorism. Within this overall picture, American armed forces are undergoing a qualitative shift of enormous proportion. In words read by President Bush: “Our forces in the next century must be agile, lethal, readily deployable, and must require a minimum of logistical support. We must be able to project our power over long distances in days or weeks rather than months. On land our heavy forces must be lighter, our light forces must be more lethal. All must be easier to deploy.” Crossing Weapons Boundaries - Both Nuclear and Conventional As a result, many boundaries and limits of the bipolar era have been breached. For example, the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons had always constituted a radical barrier. The standoff between the us and the ussr was epitomized by mind-numbing hydrogen bomb-missiles facing each other in a scenario called “Mutual Assured Destruction.î”In short, a strategic condition of deterrence prevailed, which made nuclear weapons seem unthinkable. With the demise of the ussr, deterrence no longer inhibits us nuclear weaponry, and the weapons themselves have proliferated downward, becoming miniaturized and increasingly tactical rather than strategic. Meanwhile, the genie of the weapons industries has developed ever more destructive “conventional” weapons. These include non-explosive devices of awesome power, such as laser beams, microwaves, and large-scale climate manipulation, along with a new generation of super-powerful explosive devices. Thus the strongest non-nuclear weapons are now considerably more lethal than the least powerful nuclear weapons, making the latter thinkable and eliminating a major barrier against their employment. These so-called conventional bombs have already been used, for example, in Afghanistan, where the us employed a gigantic explosive weapon, called a “Bunker Buster” to root out al-Qaeda combatants in underground bunkers. They are based upon the “daisy cutter,” a giant bomb about the size of a Volkswagen Beetle and capable of destroying everything within a square kilometer. Significantly, the model used in Afghanistan, the B61-11, already employs nuclear technology, the infamous depleted uranium warhead, capable by virtue of its extreme density, of great penetrating power. Depleted uranium (du) is a by-product of the nuclear power industry (chiefly being U-238 created in the extraction of U-235 from naturally occurring uranium ore). Over 500,000 tons of deadly du have accumulated and 4-5,000 more tons are being produced every year. Like all products of the nuclear power industry, du poses immense challenges of disposal. It has this peculiar property of being almost twice as dense as lead and it is radioactive with a half-life of 4.5 billion years. Wherever depleted uranium is used, it has another peculiar property of exploding, vaporizing at 56 degrees centigrade, which is just like a little more than half the way to boiling water. So it is very volatile, it explodes, it forms dust and powders that are inhaled, disburses widely, and produces lethal cancers, birth defects, and so forth for 4.5 billion years. In the case of depleted uranium, the challenge of disposal was met by incorporating the refuse from the “peaceful” branch of nuclear technology into the war-making branch. Already used in anti-tank projectiles in the first Iraq war (approximately 300 tons worth) and again in Yugoslavia (approximately 10-15 tons were used in each of the various Yugoslav wars), it is presumed, although the defense department coyly denies it, that this material was also used in the Afghanistan war. Depleted uranium has spread a plague of radioactivity and further rationalized the use of nuclear weapons as such. Consequently, the B61-11 is about to be replaced with the BLU113, where the bunker buster will now be a small nuclear weapon, almost certainly spear-tipped with du. Pollutants to Earth and Space To the boundaries crossed between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, and between the peaceful and militaristic uses of atomic technology, we need to add those between earth and its lower atmosphere on the one hand, and space on the other. The administration is poised to realize the crackpot and deadly schemes of the Reagan administration to militarize space and to draw the rest of the world into the scheme, as client and victim. In November 2002, Bush proposed that nato allies build missile defense systems, with components purchased, needless to add, from Boeing, Raytheon, etc, even as Congress was approving a fiscal 2003 defense budget containing $7.8 billion authorization for missile defense research and procurement, as part of the $238 billion set aside for Star Wars over the next 20 years. The administration now is poised to realize the crackpot and deadly schemes of the Reagan administration to militarize space and to draw the rest of the world into the scheme, as client and victim. A new missile defense system bureaucracy has risen. It is currently developing such wild items as something called ìbrilliant pebblesî which involves the release of endless numbers of mini satellites into outer space. All of this was to protect the world against the threat of rogue states such as North Korea. As the Seattle Times reported, the us expects the final declaration to, “express the need to examine options to protect allied forces, territories, and population centers against the full range of missile threats.” As an official put it, "This will establish the framework within which nato allies could work cooperatively toward fielding the required capabilities. With the us withdrawal this year from the anti-ballistic treaty with Russia, it is no longer a question of whether missile defenses will be deployed. The relevant questions are now what, how, and when. The train is about to pull out of the station; we invite our friends, allies, and the Russian Federation to climb on board." The destination of this train is defensive only in the Orwellian sense, as the missiles will be used to defend us troops in the field. In other words, they will be used to defend armies engaged in offensive activities. What is being “defended” by the Strategic Defense Initiative (sdi), therefore, is the initiative to make war everywhere. Space has now become the ultimate battlefield. And not just with use of these missiles. The High Frequency Active Aural Research Program (haarp) is also part of sdi. This amounts to weather warfare: deliberately manipulating climate to harm and destroy adversaries. A very dubious enterprise, to say the least, in an age when global warming and climate instability are already looming as two of the greatest problems facing civilization. The chief feature is a network of powerful antennas capable of creating controlled local modifications of the ionosphere and hence producing weather disturbances and so forth. All of these technical interventions are accompanied by many kinds of institutional and political changes. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, nasa, for instance, is now a partner in the development of this strategic defense initiative. The very way in which the United Nations was drawn into the resolution in the war against Iraq is a breach and a violation of the original un Charter, which is to never make war, never to threaten to make war on any member state. The un was a peacemaking institution, but now the Super power has forced it into its orbit. The scrapping of the abm and other elements of the treaty structure (non- proliferation, test-ban) that had organized the world of the Cold War is one part of a process of shedding whatever might inhibit the cancerous growth of militarism. It also creates an atmosphere of general lawlessness in the world. This is felt at all levels, from the rise of an ultra-militarist clique in the White House to the formal renunciation of no-first-use nuclear strategy, the flouting of numerous un regulations, the doctrine of pre-emptive war, and, as the logical outcome of all these developments, the condition of Permanent War and its accompaniment of general lawlessness, media slavishness, and a wave of repression for whose parallel we have to go back to the Alien and Sedition acts of the 1790s, or Trumanís loyalty oaths of 1947. Militarism cannot be reduced to politics, economics, technology, culture, or psychology. All these are parts of the machine, make the machine go around, and are themselves produced by the actions of the machine. There is no doubt, in this regard, that the machine runs on natural resources (which have to be secured by economic, political, and military action), and that it is deeply embedded in the ruling corporate order. There is no contradiction here, but a set of meshing parts, driven by an insensate demand for fossil fuel energy. As a man from Amarillo, Texas put it when interviewed by npr as to the correctness of Bush’s plan to go to war in Iraq: “I agree with the president, because how else are we going to get the oil to fly the F-16s?” We go to war, in other words, to get the oil needed to go to war. A Who's Who List of MIC Beneficiaries The fact that our government is front-loaded with oil magnates is another part of the machine. It is of interest, therefore, that Unocal, for example, celebrated Condoleezza Riceís ascendancy to the post of National Security Advisor by naming an oil tanker after her. Or that Dick Cheney, originally a poor boy, became a rich man after the first Gulf War, when he switched from being Secretary of Defense, in charge of destroying the Kuwait oil fields, to ceo of a then-smallish company, Halliburton, in charge of rebuilding the same oil fields. Or that G.W. Bush himself, aside from his failed venture with Harken Oil, is scion of a family and a dynasty that controls the Carlyle Group, founded in 1987 by a former Carter administration official. Carlyle is now worth over $13 billion and its high officials include President Bush I, his Secretary of State (and fixer of the coup that put Bush II in power) James Baker, Reaganís Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, former British Prime Minister John Major, and former Phillipine President Fidel Ramos, among others. The Carlyle Group has its fingers everywhere, including ìdefenseî, where it controls firms making vertical missile launch systems currently in use on us Navy ships in the Arabian sea, as well as a range of other weapons delivery systems and combat vehicles. And as a final touch which the worldís people would be much better off for knowing, there are very definite connections between Carlyle and the family of Osama bin Laden - a Saudi power whose fortunes have been fused with those of the United States since the end of World War II. Thus the military-industrial complex lives, breathes, and takes on new dimensions. There is a deep structural reason for the present explosion of us militarism, most clearly traceable in the activities of Vice President Cheney, made clear in the energy report that he introduced with the generous assistance of Enron executives in May 2001. According to the report, American reliance on imported oil will rise by from about 52 percent of total consumption in 2001 to an estimated 66 percent in 2020. The reason for this is that world production, in general, and domestic production in particular are going to remain flat (and, although the report does not discuss this, begin dropping within the next 20 years). Meanwhile consumptionówhich is a direct function of the relentless drive of capitalism to expand commodity productionóis to grow by some two- thirds. Because the usage of oil must rise in the worldview of a Cheney, the us will actually have to import 60 percent more oil in 2020 to keep itself going than it does today. This means that imports will have to rise from their current rate of about 10.4 million barrels per day to about 16.7 million barrels per day. In the words of the report: “The only way to do this is persuade foreign suppliers to increase their production to sell more of their output to the us.” The meaning of these words depends of course on the interpretation of “persuade”, which in the us lexicon is to be read, I should think, as requiring a sufficient military machine to coerce foreign suppliers. At that point they might not even have to sell their output to the us, as it would already be possessed by the superpower. Here we locate the root material fact underlying recent us expansionism. This may seem an extravagant conclusion. However an explicit connection to militarismóand Iraqóhad been supplied the month before, in April 2001, in another report prepared by James Baker and submitted to the Bush cabinet. This document, called “Strategic Energy Policy Challenges for the 21st Century,” concludes with refreshing candor that ìthe us remains a prisoner of its energy dilemma, Iraq remains a destabilizing influence to the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East, Saddam Hussein has also demonstrated a willingness to threaten to use the oil weapon and to use his own export program to manipulate oil markets, therefore the us should conduct an immediate policy review toward Iraq, including military, energy, economic, and political diplomatic assessments. Note the absence of reference to “weapons of mass destruction,” or aid to terrorism, convenient rationalizations that can be filled in later. Clearly, however things turn out with Iraq, the fundamental structural dilemma driving the military machine pertains to the contradictions of an empire that drives toward the invasion of all social space and the total control over nature. Since the former goal meets up with unending resistance and the latter crashes against the finitude of the material world, there is no recourse except the ever-widening resort to force. But this, the military monster itself, ever seeking threats to feed upon, becomes a fresh source of danger, whether of nuclear war, terror, or ecological breakdown. The situation is plainly unsustainable, a series of disasters waiting to happen. It can only be checked and brought to rationality by a global uprising of people who demand an end to the regime of endless war. This is the only possible path by which we can pull ourselves away from the abyss into which the military machine is about to plunge, dragging us all down with it.

#### **the aff’s certain calculations about war are an impossibly arrogant form of mechanical, sterile analysis that eases the path towards war. their language is coopted to provide rhetorical ammunition for militarists. our alternative is not pure pacifism, but rather a pacifist analysis that injects moral and epistemic doubt into our decisionmaking about war – this is the only way to formulate better policies that address structural causes of war and avoids inevitable cycles of violence**

Neu 13 – prof @ U of Brighton

(Michael, International Relations 27(4), December, The Tragedy of Justified War)

Just war theory is not concerned with millions of starving people who could be saved from death and disease with a fraction of the astronomical amount of money that, every year, goes into the US defence budget alone (a budget that could no longer be justified if the United States ran out of enemies one day). It is not interested in exposing the operat- ing mechanisms of a global economic structure that is suppressive and exploitative and may be conducive to outbreaks of precisely the kind of violence that their theory is con- cerned with. As intellectually impressive as analytical just war accounts are, they do not convey any critical sense of Western moralism. It is as though just war theory were written for a different world than the one we occupy: a world of morally responsible, structurally unconstrained, roughly equal agents, who have non-complex and non-exploitative relationships, relationships that lend themselves to easy epistemic access and binary moral analysis. Theorists write with a degree of confidence that fails to appreciate the moral and epistemic fragility of justified war, the long-term genesis of violent conflict, structural causes of violence and the moralistic attitudes that politicians and the media are capable of adopting. To insist that, in the final analysis, the injustice of wars is completely absorbed by their being justified reflects a way of doing moral philosophy that is frighteningly mechanical and sterile. It does not do justice to individual persons,59 it is nonchalant about suffering of unimaginable proportions and it suffocates a nuanced moral world in a rigid binary structure designed to deliver unambiguous, action-guiding recommendations. According to the tragic conception defended here, justified warfare constitutes a moral evil, not just a physical one – whatever Coates’ aforementioned distinction is supposed to amount to. If we do not recognise the moral evil of justified warfare, we run the risk of speaking the following kind of language when talking to a tortured mother, who has witnessed her child being bombed into pieces, justifiably let us assume, in the course of a ‘just war’: See, we did not bomb your toddler into pieces intentionally. You should also consider that our war was justified and that, in performing this particular act of war, we pursued a valid moral goal of destroying the enemy’s ammunition factory. And be aware that killing your toddler was not instrumental to that pursuit. As you can see, there was nothing wrong with what we did. (OR: As you can see, we only infringed the right of your non-liable child not to be targeted, but we did not violate it.) Needless to say, we regret your loss. This would be a deeply pathological thing to say, but it is precisely what at least some contemporary just war theorists would seem to advise. The monstrosity of some accounts of contemporary just war theory seems to derive from a combination of the degree of certainty with which moral judgments are offered and the ability to regard the moral case as closed once the judgments have been made. One implication of my argument for just theorists is clear enough: they should critically reflect on the one-dimensionality of their dominant agenda of making binary moral judgments about war. If they did, they would become more sympathetic to the pacifist argument, not to the conclusion drawn by pacifists who are also caught in a binary mode of thinking (i.e. never wage war, regardless of the circumstances!) but to the timeless wisdom that forms the essence of the pacifist argument. It is wrong to knowingly kill and maim people, and it does not matter, at least not as much as the adherents of double effect claim, whether the killing is done intentionally or ‘merely’ with foresight. The difference would be psychological, too. Moral philosophers of war would no longer be forced to concede this moral truth; rather, they would be free to embrace it. There is no reason for them to disrespect the essence of pacifism. The just war theorist Larry May implicitly offers precisely such a tragic vision in his sympathetic discussion of ‘Grotius and Contingent Pacifism’. According to May, ‘war can sometimes be justified on the same grounds on which certain forms of pacifism are themselves grounded’.60 If this is correct, just war theorists have good reason to stop calling themselves by their name. They would no longer be just war theorists, but unjust war theorists, confronting politicians with a jus contra bellum, rather than offering them a jus ad bellum. Beyond being that, they would be much ‘humbler in [their] approach to considering the justness of war’ (or, rather, the justifiability), acknowledging that: notions of legitimate violence which appear so vivid and complete to the thinking individual are only moments and snapshots of a wider history concerning the different ways in which humans have ordered their arguments and practices of legitimate violence. Humility in this context does not mean weakness. It involves a concern with the implicit danger of adopting an arrogant approach to the problem of war.61 Binary thinking in just war theory is indeed arrogant, as is the failure to acknowledge the legitimacy of – and need for – ambiguity, agony and doubt in moral thinking about war. Humble philosophers of war, on the contrary, would acknowledge that any talk of justice is highly misleading in the context of war.62 It does not suffice here, in my view, to point out that ‘we’ have always understood what ‘they’ meant (assuming they meant what we think they meant). Fiction aside, there is no such thing as a just war. There is also no such thing as a morally justified war that comes without ambiguity and moral remainders. Any language of justified warfare must therefore be carefully drafted and constantly questioned. It should demonstrate an inherent, acute awareness of the fragility of moral thinking about war, rather than an eagerness to construct unbreakable chains of reasoning. Being uncertain about, and agonised by, the justifiability of waging war does not put a moral philosopher to shame. The uncertainty is not only moral, it is also epistemic. Contemporary just war theorists proceed as if certainty were the rule, and uncertainty the exception. The world to which just war theory applies is one of radical and unavoidable uncertainty though, where politicians, voters and combatants do not always know who their enemies are; whether or not they really exist (and if so, why they exist and how they have come into existence); what weapons the enemies have (if any); whether or not, when, and how they are willing to employ them; why exactly the enemies are fought and what the consequences of fighting or not fighting them will be. Philosophers of war should also become more sensitive to the problem of political moralism. The just war language is dangerous, particularly when spoken by eager, self- righteous, over-confident moralists trying to make a case. It would be a pity if philosophers of war, despite having the smartest of brains and the best of intentions, effectively ended up delivering rhetorical ammunition to political moralists. To avoid being inadvertently complicit in that sense, they could give public lectures on the dangers of political moralism, that is, on thinking about war in terms of black and white, good and evil and them and us. They could warn us against Euro-centrism, missionary zeal and the emperors’ moralistic clothes. They could also investigate the historical genesis and structural conditionality of large-scale aggressive behaviour in the global arena, deconstruct- ing how warriors who claim to be justified are potentially tied into histories and structures, asking them: Who are you to make that claim? A philosopher determined to go beyond the narrow discursive parameters provided by the contemporary just war paradigm would surely embrace something like Marcus’ ‘second-order regulative principle’, which could indeed lead to ‘“better” policy’.63 If justified wars are unjust and if it is true that not all tragedies of war are authentic, then political agents ought to prevent such tragedies from occurring. This demanding principle, however, may require a more fundamental reflection on how we ‘conduct our lives and arrange our institutions’ (Marcus) in this world. It is not enough to adopt a ‘wait and see’ policy, simply waiting for potential aggressions to occur and making sure that we do not go to war unless doing so is a ‘last resort’. Large-scale violence between human beings has causes that go beyond the individual moral failure of those who are potentially aggressing, and if it turns out that some of these causes can be removed ‘through more careful decision-making’ (Lebow), then this is what ought to be done by those who otherwise deprive themselves, today, of the possibility of not wronging tomorrow.

### 1NC Solvency

#### Neither the courts nor Congress want to play a role in authorizing war – they won’t enforce the aff

Gene Healy 2009 (vice president at the Cato Institute) “Reclaiming the War Power” http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2009/9/hb111-10.pdf

Each of these proposals has the merit of demanding that Congress carry the burden the Constitution places upon it: responsibility for the decision to go to war. The Gelb-Slaughter plan shows particular promise. Although Congress hasn’t declared war since 1942, reviving the formal declaration would make it harder for legislators to punt that decision to the president, as they did in Vietnam and Iraq. Hawks should see merit in making declarations mandatory, since a declaration commits those who voted for it to support the president and provide the resources he needs to prosecute the war successfully. Doves too should find much to applaud in the idea: forcing Congress to take a stand might concentrate the mind wonderfully and reduce the chances that we will find ourselves spending blood and treasure in conflicts that were not carefully examined at the outset. But we should be clear about the difficulties that comprehensive war powers reform entails. Each of these reforms presupposes a Congress eager to be held accountable for its decisions, a judiciary with a stomach for interbranch struggles, and a voting public that rewards political actors who fight to put the presidency in its place. Representative Jones’s Constitutional War Powers Resolution, which seeks to draw the judiciary into the struggle to constrain executive war making, ignores the Court’s resistance to congressional standing, as well as the 30-year history of litigation under the War Powers Resolution, a history that shows how adept the federal judiciary is at constructing rationales that allow it to avoid picking sides in battles between Congress and the president. Even if Jones’s Constitutional War Powers Resolution or Ely’s Combat Authorization Act could be passed today, and even if the courts, defying most past practice, grew bold enough to rule on whether hostilities were imminent, there would be still another difficulty; as Ely put it: ‘‘When we got down to cases and a court remanded the issue to Congress, would Congress actually be able to follow through and face the issue whether the war in question should be permitted to proceed? Admittedly, the matter is not entirely free from doubt.’’ It’s worth thinking about how best to tie Ulysses to the mast. But the problem with legislative schemes designed to force Congress to ‘‘do the right thing’’ is that Congress seems always to have one hand free. Statutory schemes designed to precommit legislators to particular procedures do not have a terribly promising track record. Historically, many such schemes have proved little more effective than a dieter’s note on the refrigerator. No mere statute can truly bind a future Congress, and in areas ranging from agricultural policy to balanced budgets, Congress has rarely hesitated to undo past agreements in the pursuit of short-term political advantage. A : 14431$CH10 11-11-08 14:18:58 Page 113 Layout: 14431 : Odd 113 C ATO H ANDBOOK FOR P OLICYMAKERS If checks on executive power are to be restored, we will need far less Red Team–Blue Team politicking—and many more legislators than we currently have who are willing to put the Constitution ahead of party loyalty. That in turn will depend on a public willing to hold legislators accountable for ducking war powers fights and ceding vast authority to the president. Congressional courage of the kind needed to reclaim the war power will not be forthcoming unless and until American citizens demand it.

### 1NC Warfighting

#### Alt causes to power projection failure – Domestic gridlock and China

Jakarta Globe – 10/5/13, Robertus Wardi & Abdul Khalik , Obama’s Absence is Chance for China to Steal the Show, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/obamas-absence-is-chance-for-china-to-steal-the-show/

The absence of US President Barack Obama at two key Asia meetings next week could be a pivotal moment in China’s dominance in the region, analysts here said, raising questions about the United States’ capacity to extend its influence to other parts of the world when it is forced to grapple with problems at home. On Thursday, Obama canceled his attendance in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference taking place in Bali from Oct. 7-8 and the East Asia Summit in Brunei later in the week, blaming the US government shutdown for the cancelation of a tour designed to advance a central prong of his foreign policy. Instead, US Secretary of State John Kerry will take Obama’s place so that the president can stay home to focus on the budget gridlock in Washington that triggered the first government shutdown in 17 years. Obama was scheduled to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, among other leaders, at the summits. Two of his main aims would have been to discuss the Syria crisis with Putin and to hold talks on a maritime code of conduct for disputed territories in the oil- and gas-rich South China Sea. “We are disappointed,” Indonesian Information Minister Tifatul Sembiring said in Bali. “I think the summit will go on, there is a long-term plan. But without Obama, you can imagine how disappointed we are. We could hardly imagine he wouldn’t come.” Indonesian analysts said China looked to dominate the two meetings, and would come up with initiatives, while boosting further its aids, investment and trades with countries in Asia. “Obama’s cancelation clearly gives China an upper hand over the US in their rivalry for influence in the region,” Aleksius Jemadu, dean of Pelita Harapan University’s School of Social and Political Sciences, said. He said that while it was too soon to declare “the end of American hegemony in Asia with Obama’s failure to attend the meetings, US allies in the region would question the seriousness behind the rhetoric of Asia focus Obama administration has been trying to work on. “It may be too soon to say it’s the end of American empire as we know it because of this setback, as many parameters need to be reviewed. We, however, notice that there is something wrong with the way US runs its economy. I think at least in Asia, the signs of US losing influence are already apparent with China is aggressively investing and trading with countries in the region,” Aleksius said. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Chinese President Xi Jinping on Thursday witnessed the signing of 23 new business agreements valued at almost $33 billion between the two nations, during the latter’s first trip to Southeast Asia since being elected. On Friday, Xi and Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak held a meeting soon after Obama canceled his trip to Kuala Lumpur with both countries set to elevate bilateral ties to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” aiming to boost military cooperation and nearly triple two-way trade to $160 billion by 2017. China has been steadily increasing its influence in the region in recent years, and faced with China’s growing influence across the region, Obama announced in 2011 a pivot towards Asia as the US brought wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to an end. Malaysia is one of several Asian nations that has competing territorial claims with China over the resource-rich South China Sea, but it has kept a lower profile in the dispute than the Philippines and Vietnam and downplays regional concerns over Beijing’s rising military clout. Indonesian Defense University expert Bantarto Bandoro said China could fill the void left by the United States, which could be too preoccupied by domestic concerns. “If Obama decides not to attend APEC in Bali, then China could steal the show, and this could be a pivotal start of bigger influence in the future,” he said. “For now, US domestic political reality hinders the country’s capability and outreach to stage presence and influence far away from home. It could be the beginning of an end of American global dominance,” he said.

### 1NC Congress

#### Congressional influence doesn’t lead to better war decision making – empirical evidence

Nzelibe and Yoo 2005 - Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University Law School AND Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Jide and John, “Rational War and Constitutional Design ” 115 Yale L.J. 2512 (2005), <http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1067&context=facpubs>)

Bur before accepting this seemingly attractive vision, we should ask whether the Congress-first system lives up to its promises. In other words, has requiring congressional ex ante approval for foreign wars produced less war, better decision-making, or greater consensus? A cursory review of previous American wars does not suggest that requiring congressional authorization before the use of force invariably produces better decision-making. For example, the declarations of war initiating the Mexican-American and Spanish-American Wars did not result from extensive deliberation or necessarily result in good policy. Although both wars benefited the United States by expanding the nation's territory and enhancing its presence on the world stage,14 they remained offensive wars of conquest. Nor is it clear that congressional participation has resulted in greater consensus. Congress approved both the Vietnam and the 2003 Iraq Wars, but both have produced sharp divisions in American domestic politics.

# 2nc

## k

### fw

#### The role of the teacher is to guide students toward ethically constructing advocacies – this means debate should focus on how we think about problems and not just the particular policy, so you should look at systems of militarism versus pacifism and not the singular event of their impact scenarios – and deprioritize issues of link uniqueness and transition wars – our link arguments prove there’s a larger set of social relations the plan creates and the standpoints we take in relation to that are important.

#### The alt is a technique for creating a new social vocabulary surrounding war – if our vocabulary is good, you should endorse and adopt it as a way of reading future policy research.

#### **Subject formation is what we are trying to accomplish in debate on an everyday level, we form better subjects by attuning our ethical sensibilities to the violence of militarism – comparatively more effective than a hubristic fantasy that we can change the world**

Chandler, Professor of IR at Westminster, 13

(The World of Attachment? The Post-humanist Challenge to Freedom and Necessity, Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 41(3), 516– 534)

The world of becoming thereby is an ontologically flat world without the traditional hierarchies of existence and a more shared conception of agency. For Bennett, therefore, ‘to begin to experience the relationship between persons and other materialities more horizontally, is to take a step toward a more ecological sensibility’.78 Here there is room for human agency but this agency involves a deeper understanding of and receptivity to the world of objects and object relations. Rather than the hubristic focus on transforming the external world, the ethico-political tasks are those of work on the self to erase hubristic liberal traces of subject-centric understandings, understood to merely create the dangers of existential resentment. Work on the self is the only route to changing the world. As Connolly states: ‘To embrace without deep resentment a world of becoming is to work to “become who you are”, so that the word “become” now modifies “are” more than the other way around.’ Becoming who you are involves the ‘microtactics of the self’, and work on the self can then extend into ‘micropolitics’ of more conscious and reflective choices and decisions and lifestyle choices leading to potentially higher levels of ethical self-reflectivity and responsibility. Bennett argues that against the ‘narcissism’ of anthropomorphic understandings of domination of the external world, we need ‘some tactics for cultivating the experience of our selves as vibrant matter’. Rather than hubristically imagining that we can shape the world we live in, Bennett argues that: ‘Perhaps the ethical responsibility of an individual human now resides in one’s response to the assemblages in which one finds oneself participating. Such ethical tactics include reflecting more on our relationship to what we eat and considering the agentic powers of what we consume and enter into an assemblage with. In doing so, if ‘an image of inert matter helps animate our current practice of aggressively wasteful and planet-endangering consumption, then a materiality experienced as a lively force with agentic capacity could animate a more ecologically sustainable public’. For new materialists, the object to be changed or transformed is the human – the human mindset. By changing the way we think about the world and the way we relate to it by including broader, more non-human or inorganic matter in our considerations, we will have overcome our modernist ‘attachment disorders’ and have more ethically aware approaches to our planet. In cultivating these new ethical sensibilities, the human can be remade with a new self and a ‘new self-interest’.

### alt fails

#### **Militaristic war may be a central value of modern Western culture, but it can be changed through analysis – multiple empirical examples prove**

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 23-24)

The slow but persistent rise in awareness of racial, ethnic, gender, sexual- orientation, and class oppression in our time and the beginning efforts of liberation from within oppressed groups offer hope that even the most deeply held and least explicitly challenged predispositions of culture might be examined. Such examinations can lead to changes in the lives of the oppressed. Perhaps even those oppressed by warism will one day free themselves from accepting war as an inevitable condition of nature. Two hundred years ago slavery was a common and well- established social institution in the United States. It had been an ordinary feature of many societies dating to ancient and perhaps prehistoric times. Slavery was taken for granted as a natural condition for beings thought to be inferior to members of the dominant group. And slavery was considered an essential feature of our nation’s economy. Within the past two centuries, attitudes toward slavery have changed dramatically. With these fundamental shifts in normative lenses came fundamental shifts in the practice and legality of slavery. These changes have been as difficult as they have been dramatic, for former slaves, for former slave- holders, and for culture at large. While deep racial prejudices persist to this day, slavery is no longer tolerated in modern societies. Slavery- like conditions of severe economic exploitation of labor have become embarrassments to dominant groups in part because slavery is universally condemned. The point is that the most central values of cultures— thought to be essential to the very survival of the society and allegedly grounded in the natural conditions of creation—can change in fundamental ways in relatively short periods of time with profound implications for individuals and societies. John Dewey beautifully links this point to the consideration of warism: “War is as much a social pattern [for us] as was the domestic slavery which the ancients thought to be immutable fact.”9 The civil rights movement has helped us see that human worth is not determined by a racial hierarchy. Feminism has helped us realize again that dominant attitudes about people are more likely values we choose rather than innate and determined features of human nature. It is historically true that men have been more actively violent and have received more training and encouragement in violence than have women.10 Dominant attitudes of culture have explained this by reference to what is “natural” for males and “natural” for females. By questioning the traditional role models for men and women, all of us be- come more free to choose and create the selves we are to be; we need not be defined by hidden presumptions of gender roles. Parallel to racial and gender liberation movements, pacifism questions taking warism for granted. Pacifists seek an examination of our unquestioned assumption of warism to expose it as racism and sexism have been examined and exposed. Just as opponents of racism and sex- ism consider the oppression of nonwhites and women, respectively, to be wrong, and thus to require fundamental changes in society, so opponents of warism— pacifists of various sorts— consider war to be wrong, and thus to require fundamental changes in society.

### Overview

#### **The kritik outweighs and turns the case – first, their militaristic mindset makes wars and violence inevitable**

#### **The nuclear war doesn’t happen the moment that the key is turned on the nuclear launch pad, the nuclear war happens in the processes of weapons buildups, the aggressive foreign policy that sparks proliferation, etc. – their focus on the moment of the launch obstructs from the discussion of the structural war – we spend all of our time trying to chase down single, specific hotspot scenarios and don’t engage the structures that made the conditions of war possible – this ensures that wars will always recur**

#### Second, the structures of militarism also ensure constant structural violence – our Lawrence evidence says that the military is based on the fundamental exclusion of racial, feminized, and poor others – creates systems of everyday violence that make entire populations subject to pollution and mass inequality

#### **Prefer this impact – structural violence is invisible and exponential – ethics**

Nixon 11

(Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 2-3)

Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink-politically, imaginatively, and theoretically-what I call "slow violence." By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings-the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change-are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory. Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions-from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.

#### Extend our argument about epistemic uncertainty and war from the Neu card causal linear IR predictions are inherently incomplete – epistemic uncertainty is the defining principle of international politics

Hendrick 9 – PhD from Bradford U, contributor to Oxford University Press

(Diane, “Complexity Theory and Conflict Transformation: An Exploration of Potential and Implications”, http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/papers/pdfs/CCR17.pdf)

In international relations Neil E. Harrison makes the case for the value of complexity theory given the unpredictability of events in world politics that has confounded expectations based on existing theories. While there are various explanations proffered for this situation, Harrison sees the tendency of current theories of world politics to work with models of the social world that present it, for analytical purposes, as a simple system as fundamentally misleading. In contrast to realism, that sees political behaviour being driven by essential human characteristics within fixed structures, complexity theory sees world politics as a self- organising complex system in which macroproperties emerge from microinteractions. It is precisely the interactions among interdependent but individual agents within the system that account for the surprising events that defy prediction through the simple models used at the moment. Harrison thus takes the state as a system that is not closed but open to other natural and social systems: “defined as a political system, it is open to technological, cultural and economic systems that influence political choices and processes.” (Harrison, 2006 p. 8) The state is also influenced by other states and by numerous transboundary interactions between major corporations, NGOs, terrorist groups, etc. In such complex systems it is not possible to trace linear causal links: “Despite occasional attempts to bring in domestic politics the state is usually modelled as a unit with exogenous identity and objective interests. This greatly reduces the range of possible causal explanations for any perceived social event, simplifying causal analysis and hypothesis generation and testing.” (Harrison, 2006 p. 11) It is a disconcerting fact that outcomes may have multiple causes and that in different contexts, historically or spatially, the same cause may lead to different outcomes. This cannot be captured by the over-simplified models of international systems. Given the multiple, mutually influencing interactions within social systems it is necessary to look to the evolution of the system rather than to individual events when seeking the causes of observed effects. Complexity theory focuses on processes and relations between components, or in the case of social systems, agents, rather than the components themselves. In a similar criticism to that of Walby, Harrison points to the tendency of theories in international relations to focus on one level of analysis and to present competing theories based on these. Where systems are theorised, they are limited by being presented as nested. Harrison notes that the impact of positive feedback in systems has been acknowledged: “ ‘(I)ntra-national and inter-national events all impinge on one another in a cyclical and ongoing process within which the self-aggravating propensities frequently exceed the self-correcting ones by an unacceptably large amount’ (Singer 1970, 165) thus national elites use rhetoric for domestic political consumption that can incite potential enemies, the public and military desire the psychological comfort of discernible superiority, media amplify inter-nation conflicts, and the benefits of participation in the ideological mainstream preserve the distribution of power and inhibit changes in the historic patterns that transform inevitable conflicts into costly rivalries.” (Harrison, 2006 p. 28) While Walby refers to examples of the importance of the notion of path dependence with reference to differences in development between countries, Harrison sees its relevance at the level of the international state system. Thus development through time is not wholly random and there are limits or constraints created by the prior development of the system that restrict the possible options for change. In this way the international system may change its structure without becoming another system and here Harrison brings the example of the Cold War. While it is true that the Cold War was produced by historical interactions, it is still not possible to claim that it was an inevitable effect of historical causes. The myriad microinteractions that occurred introduce unpredictability into development, especially given the above-mentioned possibility of positive feedback. Harrison is optimistic with regard to the gains from the application of complexity theory to world politics in theoretical but also in policy terms: “This ontological shift from simple to complex systems opens new paths to knowledge and understanding yet incorporates much current knowledge; it validates novel research methods; and theories founded in this approach will generate radically different solutions to policy problems.” (Harrison, 2006 p. 2)

### 2nc at: perm

#### **1. the permutation is severance or it links – our criticism is about the way that legal restrictions sanitize our thinking about the morality of war, the affirmative is tied to defending legalism because of the nature of their restriction – severance is a voting issue because it denies stable link ground and makes the aff a moving target**

#### **2. doubt must come first, the affirmative’s footnoting of the alternative doesn’t solve and obscures moral analysis**

Neu 13 – prof @ U of Brighton

(Michael, International Relations 27(4), The Tragedy of Justified War)

I cannot provide an extensive account of binary thinking and lacking ambiguity in contemporary just war theory here. A few examples, picked from a pool of many more contemporary theorists whose works one could draw on, may suffice to make the relevant point. It should become apparent that most of the thinkers I refer to do recognize the ambiguity of moral justifications for war.28 However, they do not place this recognition at the centre of their moral arguments about war. That is, they somehow fail to engage with the tragedy of justified war in the broad sense. There is some fragmented talk of tragedies, moral dilemmas, dirty hands and rights infringements, but no critical engagement with the kind of thinking in just war theory that is predominantly – or in some cases even exclusively – concerned with drawing binary distinctions between just and unjust wars and military operations. The core question raised in the literature is whether or not one may wage war, and whether or not certain military operations may be undertaken; once the answer has been found, the moral case is closed – particularly, but not exclusively – in just war accounts that embrace the kind of style described by Brown.29 This style, of course, is not Michael Walzer’s. When contemporary analytical philosophers deride his contributions to just war theory as some kind of ‘story-telling’,30 devoid of conceptual clarity, argumentative rigour and methodological finesse, it is perhaps sentences like the following one that critics have in mind: ‘[T]he theory of war, when it is fully under- stood, poses a dilemma, which every theorist ... must resolve as best as he can’.31 Walzer’s thinking nonetheless falls prey to the kind of binary thinking that analytical theorists would take to new heights a couple of decades later on. While Walzer famously defends the conceptual plausibility of the notion of dirty hands, according to which especially politicians must sometimes do wrong to do right, he introduces this concept into his theory of ‘just and unjust wars’ only in his account of ‘supreme emergencies’. Here, political communities cannot help but engage in the intentional killing of innocent people: [D]irty hands aren’t permissible (or necessary) when anything less than the ongoingness of the community is at stake, or when the danger we face is anything less than communal death. In most wars, the issue never arises; there are no supreme emergencies; the normal defense of rights holds unquestioned sway.32

#### 3. no net benefit - the aff can't win that they reduce violence, they merely transfer it/recreate cycles

#### **4. mutually exclusive – the quest for negative peace trades off with positive peace through pacifism**

Pankhurst 3

(Donna-, May 1, Development in Practice, “The 'sex war' and other wars: towards a feminist approach to peace building”, Vol. 13 # 2&3, Infomaworld; Jacob)

Turning to the meanings of the term ‘peace’, Galtung’s (1985) conception of negative peace has come into widespread use, and is probably the most common meaning given to the word, i.e. the end or absence of widespread violent conflict associated with war. A ‘peaceful’ society in this sense may therefore include a society in which social violence (against women, for instance) and/or structural violence (in situations of extreme inequality, for example) are prevalent. Moreover, this limited ‘peace goal’, of an absence of specific forms of violence associated with war, can and often does lead to a strategy in which all other goals become secondary. The absence of analysis of the deeper (social) causes of violence also paves the way for peace agreements that leave major causes of violent conflict completely unresolved. Negative peace may therefore be achieved by accepting a worse state of affairs than that which motivated the outburst of violence in the first place, for the sake of (perhaps short-term) ending organised violence. Galtung’s alternative vision, that of positive peace, requires not only that all types of violence be minimal or non-existent, but also that the major potential causes of future conflict be removed. In other words, major conflicts of interest, as well as their violent manifestation, need to be resolved. Positive peace encompasses an ideal of how society should be, but the details of such a vision often remain implicit, and are rarely discussed. Some ideal characteristics of a society experiencing positive peace would include: an active and egalitarian civil society; inclusive democratic political structures and processes; and open and accountable government. Working towards these objectives opens up the field of peace building far more widely, to include the promotion and encouragement of new forms of citizenship and political participation to develop active democracies. It also opens up the fundamental question of how an economy is to be managed, with what kind of state intervention, and in whose interests. But more often than not discussion of these important issues tends to be closed off, for the sake of ‘ending the violence’, leaving major causes of violence and war unresolved—including not only economic inequalities, but also major social divisions and the social celebration of violent masculinities.

#### **cooperation with European allies is pressure to militarize our friends to deter our enemies – ensures backlash that escalates to war and turns case**

Smith 12 – ISR Review Board Member

(Ashley, International Socialist Review, Obama’s New Imperialist Strategy, http://isreview.org/issue/83/obamas-new-imperialist-strategy)

Faced with the growing rivalry with China and America’s diminished power in the Middle East, the Obama administration has been compelled to adjust the grand strategy of global domination. Obama still intends for the United States to be, in his words, “the indispensable nation,” the world’s policeman. He will therefore continue to project American power into its traditional spheres of influence like Latin America, as well as expand its activity into other areas such as Africa, for example, through AFRICOM.¶ Contrary to liberal self-delusion, Obama is not really cutting the military budget. As he declared at the Pentagon announcement of his new Guidance,¶ Over the next ten years, the growth in the defense budget will slow, but the fact of the matter is this: it will still grow, because we have global responsibilities that demand our leadership. In fact, the defense budget will still be larger than it was toward the end of the Bush administration.5¶ Washington is simply recalibrating its military hardware, personnel, and deployment to fit its new objectives. This involves reducing its military presence in Europe. More importantly, given the costs and questionable results of its Iraq and Afghanistan wars, it involves moving away from direct military invasions and occupations, and putting a stronger emphasis on the use of counterterrorist tactics that rely on Special Forces and drone strikes, as well as on “proxy” military forces. To carry this shift through, the Obama administration is cutting the size of the Army, and increasing spending on the Navy, Air Force, Special Operations Forces, and high-tech weaponry.¶ Obama has also abandoned the Pentagon’s longtime plan to have the capacity to fight two simultaneous ground wars. In its place he has put forward an alternative plan that would enable the United States to fight one war and deny the “objective of—or imposing unacceptable costs on—an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.”6 Ominously, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta offered one scenario as an example. He said the Pentagon would be set up to carry out a land war in Korea and at the same time defeat Iran in a confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz.¶ In such wars, the Obama administration wants to avoid extended occupations such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. For future operations Obama wants to use American air power and a local proxy army to conduct any regime changes. As the Wall Street Journal reports,¶ Many Obama administration officials see last year’s international military intervention in Libya as a model for future conflicts, with the United States using its air power up front while also relying on its allies, and on local force to fight on the ground.7¶ America’s European allies and especially NATO will figure prominently in the new US strategy. Obama intends for NATO’s European members to take on greater responsibility both on the continent and in “out-of-area operations” like Libya. The United States is also putting pressure on Europe—to little effect, however—to invest more in their militaries, modernize them, and make them technically compatible with the far more advanced US forces. The United States plans to shift two brigades out of Germany and Italy, which would leave only one in each country.¶ The United States plans to further develop a missile shield across Eastern Europe, nominally to prevent an attack from Iran. No one should be fooled. The real aim of the missile shield is to neutralize Russian missiles so that the United States and NATO can more easily assert themselves in Eastern Europe without fear of Russian reprisal. The United States is thus stoking tensions with Russia and encouraging an arms race in Europe. Russia has made it very clear that they see these actions as the enlargement of the American imperium and encirclement of Russia itself.¶ China also views the United States’ use of NATO as a threat. They looked upon the attack on Libya as an attempt to curtail Chinese access to North Africa and its energy resources. At one point, it appeared that they along with India and Russia would lose lucrative contracts with Libya after the TNC took power.¶ Worried about this beforehand, the Globe and Mail reports that, “state-controlled Chinese arms manufacturers were prepared to sell weapons and ammunition worth at least $200 million to the embattled Col. Gaddafi in late July, a violation of the United Nations sanctions.”8 The American use of NATO and its European allies in this fashion will tend to push Russia and China, who already collaborate in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, even closer together.

## Case

### circumvent

#### the legal concept of “anticipatory self-defense” – justification for Iraq – plan meangingless

#### Obama will circumvent the plan with creative lawyering

Hafetz, 11/5 --- law professor at Seton Hall

(11/5/2013, Jonathan, “Outrage Fatigue: The Danger of Getting Used to Gitmo,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13311/outrage-fatigue-the-danger-of-getting-used-to-gitmo))

The Obama administration has shown no shortage of creative lawyering in justifying U.S. military involvement in Libya and Syria as well as in expanding America’s use of targeted drone strikes. In those instances, the administration has interpreted presidential authority robustly, while narrowly construing congressional attempts to cabin that authority, as in the War Powers Resolution. Yet, when it comes to releasing Guantanamo detainees, the administration remains sheepish. It has failed to apply the same interpretive approach to congressional transfer restrictions despite what the president has described as the clear national security interests in closing the prison. Only external events, such as the hunger strike, now seem to prompt any action. And even there, the urgency tends to dissipate once the public pressure and media attention fades.

# 1nr

### No Thumper

#### Israel is comfortable with Syria developments – it doesn’t cross the threshold of our link because it doesn’t involve an attack against their homeland

Washington Post 2013 (September 12, “Israel divided over best course on Syria” <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-09-12/world/41992570_1_israel-s-israeli-embassy-iran>)

Israel’s diplomatic and defense establishment appears to be divided over the best course of action to take on Syria, security analysts and former military commanders here said Thursday. It has been no secret that some of Israel’s political leaders and generals were initially disappointed that President Obama sought congressional approval for missile strikes, saying it showed weakness that would embolden Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and boost Iran and its nuclear ambitions. An analysis in the Times of Israel, citing unnamed sources, said that Obama’s decision to hit the pause button had “privately horrified” Jerusalem. But that was 12 days ago. Now, many Israelis have begun to identify some advantages in a Russia-brokered diplomatic deal to secure Assad’s stores of chemical weapons, especially if it succeeds. “Israel was watching the reaction of the international community, especially the United States, as a kind of test case on how they would react to the Iran situation,” said Oded Eran, former deputy chief of mission at the Israeli Embassy in Washington. “But now there are more Israelis who are looking at the possible deal between Russia and United States on the chemical arsenal of Syria as an interesting precedent,” Eran said. “If the international community, through the U.S. and Russia, is able to put its hands on, to monitor or collect all the arsenal of Syria, this could be some sort of a precedent concerning Iran.” Israel maintains that Iran is seeking to build a nuclear weapon, a development it has described as “an existential threat.” Iran says its nuclear program is limited to research and energy production. Israel Ziv, a retired major general and former head of the Israel Defense Forces’ operations directorate, said that from a strategic standpoint, a U.S. missile strike might not have achieved much and would have posed risks. “I don’t see anything positive coming from an attack,” Ziv said. “I see more positive results, potentially, on addressing Syria’s chemical weapon stockpiles.” Ziv said it took guts not to attack Syria.

### 2NC O/V

#### Israeli feelings of vulnerability will cause them to adopt a launch on warning posture- risks miscalc, war, and nuclear escaltion

Schoenfeld 98– SENIOR EDITOR COMMENTARY

*THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE*, COMMENTARY, DECEMBER

If preemption is largely ruled out as an option, what then? To reduce its vulnerability--enemy missiles can arrive within ten minutes from firing--Israel may well be compelled to adopt a "launch-on-warning" posture for both its conventional and nuclear forces. For the purpose of considering this eventuality, we may assume that Israel has indeed developed a secure retaliatory force of the kind Tucker saw as essential to stability. Even so, however, this would not offer much reassurance. Unlike its neighbors, and unlike the U.S., Israel is a tiny country, and in a nuclear environment it would not have the luxury of waiting to assess the damage from a first strike before deciding how to respond. Thus, in any future crisis, at the first hint from satellite intelligence or some other means that a missile fusillade was being prepared from, say, Iran or Iraq, Israel, to protect its populace, would have to punch first. And it would have to strike not only at missile sites, some of which it might well miss, but at a broader range of targets--communications facilities, air bases, storage bunkers, and all other critical nodes--so as to paralyze the enemy and thus rule out the possibility of attack. These are the implications of launch-on-warning. Clearly, such a posture presents grave problems. Lacking secure second-strike forces of their own, and aware that Israel would no doubt try to hit them preemptively, Iran and Iraq would be under tremendous pressure to launch their missiles first--to "use them or lose them." In other words, what this scenario leads to is the prospect of both sides' moving to a permanent position of hair-trigger alert. It is a nightmarish prospect. The possibility that nuclear war might break out at any moment--by accident, miscalculation, or design--would inevitably place an intolerable strain on Israel's freedom of military movement, and take a no less heavy toll on civilian morale**.**

### AT: Permutation

#### The permutation is severance because the counterplan is LESS of a restriction then the plan.

#### Restrict means the aff must define the conditions in which use of armed forces is allowed

Cambridge Dictionary of American English 09

([http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=restrict\*1+0&dict=A](http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=restrict*1+0&dict=A);)

restrict verb [T] to limit (an intended action) esp. by setting the conditions under which it is allowed to happen

#### The plan says that the use of armed forces is only allowed if there is a congressional declaration of war, if there’s an armed attack against the United States, or if there’s an armed attack against our allies. All other uses of armed forces are prohibited. The counterplan adds an additional circumstance in which the use of armed forces is allowed, which is if our alignments are attacked. The permutation has to roll back the plans restriction to allow for more instances of the use of armed forces.

#### The basic rule of thumb should be that if there are more conditions where force is allowed under the counterplan than under the plan, then the counterplan is competitive because it’s less restriction.

#### Severance perms should be rejected because they eliminate all counterplan ground and make the affirmative a moving target.

#### The permutation can’t solve the net benefit without being severance because it only creates exceptions for allies and Israel isn’t one of them, that’s our Morrow evidence from the 1NC

### 2NC AT No Link

#### Israel perceives presidential guarantee is strong

The Telegraph – 3/20/13, Barack Obama in Israel: 'our alliance is eternal', http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/9942391/Barack-Obama-in-Israel-our-alliance-is-eternal.html

Mr Obama's arrival, on a visit more likely to be marked by symbolism and his homage to the ancient roots of the Jewish state than progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, sparked glowing praise from Israeli leaders. President Shimon Peres lauded Mr Obama as a "remarkable world leader" who had shown a deep personal commitment to protect Israel, taking implicit aim at a perception the US president is not sufficiently warm to the Jewish state. "A world without your friendship would invite aggression against Israel... In times of peace, in times of war, your support for Israel is unshakeable," he said. Mr Netanyahu was also effusive as Mr Obama embarked on the first overseas mission of his second term, which will also see him hold talks with Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas in Ramallah and on Friday travel to Jordan to meet King Abdullah II.

#### Congress

Kramer 13, President of Shalem College

(Martin, 9/17, Israel Likes Its U.S. Presidents Strong, www.commentarymagazine.com/2013/09/17/israel-likes-its-u-s-presidents-strong-2/

Why was Obama’s recourse to Congress so alarming? Israel has long favored strong presidential prerogatives. That’s because the crises that have faced Israel rarely ever leave it the time to work the many halls of Congress. Israel discovered the dangers of presidential weakness in May 1967, when Israel went to President Lyndon Johnson to keep a commitment—a “red line” set by a previous administration—and Johnson balked. He insisted he would have to secure congressional support first. That show of presidential paralysis left Israel’s top diplomat shaken, and set the stage for Israel’s decision to launch a preemptive war.